Despite the wide use of machine learning in adversarial settings including computer security, recent studies have demonstrated vulnerabilities to evasion attacks-carefully crafted adversarial samples that closely resemble legitimate instances, but cause misclassification. In this paper, we examine the adequacy of the leading approach to generating adversarial samples-the gradient descent approach. In particular (1) we perform extensive experiments on three datasets, MNIST, USPS and Spambase, in order to analyse the effectiveness of the gradient-descent method against non-linear support vector machines, and conclude that carefully reduced kernel smoothness can significantly increase robustness to the attack; (2) we demonstrate that separated inter-class support vectors lead to more secure models, and propose a quantity similar to margin that can efficiently predict potential susceptibility to gradient-descent attacks, before the attack is launched; and (3) we design a new adversarial sample construction algorithm based on optimising the multiplicative ratio of class decision functions.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed several demonstrations of machine learning vulnerabilities in adversarial settings [1, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 21, 23, 34] . For example, it has been shown that a wide rage of machine learning models-including deep neural networks (DNNs), support vector machines (SVMs), logistic regression, decision trees and knearest neighbours (kNNs)-can be easily fooled by evasion attacks via adversarial samples [5, 14, 26, 29, 30, 32] .
We refer to the carefully crafted inputs that resemble legitimate instances but cause misclassification, as adversarial samples, and the malicious behaviours that generate them as evasion attacks [35] . Figure 1 illustrates the attack's effect in the previously-explored vision domain [14, 32, 38] from [36] for "Adam" and "Lucas", who are correctly identified by an SVM face recogniser. However, after human-indiscernible changes are applied to Figure 1a the model mistakenly identifies Figure 1c as "Lucas". Thanks to its approximation of best-response and simplicity, gradient descent has emerged as the leading approach for creating adversarial samples [5] . While plentiful in the literature, analyses of evasion attacks tend to present only a handful of adversarial samples like Figure 1 , or attack success rates for limited hyperparameters settings. Such results are useful proofs of concept, but fail to provide a systematic analysis of the competence of the gradient descent method and best response more generally. Does the method have any structural limitations? Can gradient descent based evasion attacks be reliably thwarted, without cost to learner accuracy? Are there effective attack alternatives? This paper addresses these questions, with a case study on the support vector machine with radial basis function kernel.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first rigorous evaluation of the gradient descent method in classifier evasion settings. Not only do we demonstrate that appropriate choice of smoothness (RBF SVM kernel width) can significantly degrade attack success, but that we can even predict when attacks will be successful without ever launching them.
Main contributions: Specifically, our contributions include:
• An analysis of the kernel precision parameter's impact on the success rate of evasion attacks, illustrating the existence of a phase transition, and concluding that carefully reduced kernel smoothness achieves robustness to gradient-descent attacks without sacrificing SVM accuracy; • A novel geometric parameter related to margin, that strongly correlates with model vulnerability, providing a new avenue to predict (unseen) attack vulnerability; and • A new approach for generating adversarial samples in multiclass scenarios, with results demonstrating higher
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, , effectiveness for evasion attacks than the gradient descent method.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 overviews previous work on evasion attacks; Section 3 presents our research problem; we present a detailed example of how gradientdescent can fail in Section 4; Section 5 presents the gradient-quotient approach for constructing adversarial samples; experimental results are presented in Sections 6 and 7; and Section 8 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Barreno et al. [3] categorise how an adversary can tamper with a classifier based on whether they have (partial) control over the training data: in causative attacks, the adversary can modify the training data to manipulate the learned model; in exploratory attacks, the attacker does not poison training, but carefully alters target test instances to flip classifications. See also [2, 16] . This paper focuses on the targeted exploratory case, also known as evasion attacks [5] .
Generalising results on efficient evasion of linear classifiers via reverse engineering [23] , Nelson et al. [28] consider families of convex-inducing classifiers, and propose query algorithms that require polynomially-many queries and achieve near-optimal modification cost. The generation of adversarial samples in their setting leverages membership queries only: the target classifier responds to probes with signed classifications only. Formulating evasion as optimisation of the target classifier's continuous scores, Biggio et al. [5, 6] first used gradient descent to produce adversarial samples.
Szegedy et al. [38] demonstrate changes imperceptible to humans that cause deep neural networks (DNNs) to misclassify images. Additionally, they offer a linear explanation of adversarial samples and design a "fast gradient sign method" for generating such samples [14] . In a similar vein, Nguyen et al. [29] propose an approach for producing DNN-adversarial samples unrecognisable as such to humans.
Papernot et al. published a series of further works in this area: (1) introducing an algorithm that searches for minimal regions of inputs to perturb [32] ; (2) demonstrating effectiveness of attacking target models via surrogates-with over 80% of adversarial samples launched fooling the victim in one instance [31] ; (3) improved approaches for fitting surrogates, with further investigation of intra-and cross-technique transferability between DNNs, logistic regression, SVMs, decision trees and k-nearest neighbours [30] .
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [27] propose algorithm DeepFool for generating adversarial samples against DNNs, which leads samples along trajectories orthogonal to the decision boundary. A similar approach against linear SVM is proposed in [30] . Based on DeepFool, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] design a method for computing "universal perturbations" that fool multiple DNNs.
In terms of defending against evasion attacks, Goodfellow et al. [14] , Szegedy et al. [38] propose injecting adversarial examples into training, in order to improve the generalization capabilities of DNNs. This approach resembles active learning. Papernot et al. [33] demonstrate using distillation strategy against saliency map attack. But it has been proven to be ineffective by [9] . Carlini and Wagner [10] , Gu and Rigazio [15] , Huang et al. [17] , Luo et al. [24] , Miyato et al. [25] , Shaham et al. [37] , Zhao and Griffin [41] , Zheng et al. [42] have designed various structural modifications for neural networks. In addition, Bhagoji et al. [4] , Zhang et al. [40] propose defense methods based on dimensionality reduction via principal component analysis (PCA), and reduced feature sets, respectively. However, they contradict with [20] which suggests that more features should be used when facing adversarial evasion.
Most relevant to this paper is the work by Russu et al. [35] , which analyses the robustness of SVMs against evasion attacks, including the selection of the regularisation term, kernel function, classification costs and kernel parameters. Our work delivers a much more detailed analysis of exactly how the kernel parameters impact vulnerability of RBF SVM, and explanations of why.
PRELIMINARIES & PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section recalls evasion attacks, the gradient-descent method, the RBF SVM, and summarises the research problem addressed by this paper.
Evasion Attacks. For target classifier f : R d → {−1, 1}, the purpose of an evasion attack is to apply minimum change δ to a target input x, so that the perturbed point is misclassified, i.e., sgn(f (x)) sgn(f (x + δ)). The magnitude of adversarial perturbation δ is commonly quantified in terms of L 1 distance, i.e.,
Formally, evasion attacks are framed as optimisation:
Note that we permit attackers that can modify all features of the input, arbitrarily, but that aim to minimise the magnitude of changes. Both binary and multiclass scenarios fall into the evasion problem as described; we consider both learning tasks in this paper. In multiclass settings, attacks intending to cause specific misclassification of the test sample are known as mimicry attacks.
Gradient-Descent Method. The gradient descent method 1 has been widely used for generating adversarial samples for evasion attacks [5, 14, 27, 32] , when f outputs confidence scores in R and classifications are obtained by thresholding at τ = 0. The approach applies gradient descent to f directly, initialised at the target instance. Formally given target instance
where ε t follows an appropriately-selected step size schedule, and the iteration is terminated when f (x t ) < τ .
The Support Vector Machine. Recall the dual program of the soft-margin SVM classifier learner, with hinge-loss arg max
where {(x i , y i ), i = 1, . . . , n} is the training data with x i ∈ R n and y i ∈ {−1, 1} n , α are Lagrange multipliers, 0, 1 the all zeros, ones vectors, C > 0 the regularisation penalty parameter on misclassified samples, and G the n × n Gram matrix with entries G i j = two magenta curves display attack paths under gradient descent, of the two target points now move away from the boundary or take significantly more steps.
2 ) has precision parameter γ > 0 that controls kernel width 2/γ . By the Representer Theorem, the learned classifier
Adequacy and Improvements to Gradient-Descent Method.
While the gradient-descent method has been effective against a number of machine learning models, e.g., DNNs, linear SVMs, logistic regression [5, 14, 27, 29, 31] , there is no general guarantee that gradient descent converges to a global minimum of f (·) or even converges to local optima quickly-relevant to computational complexity (a measure of hardness) of evasion. Under linear models-a major focus of past work-gradient descent quickly finds global optima. While DNNs have been argued to exhibit local linearity, the existing body of evidence is insufficient to properly assess the effectiveness of the attack approach. As we argue in the next section, the approach is in fact unlikely to be successful against certain SVMs with RBF kernels, when kernel parameter γ is chosen appropriately. We address each of these problems in this paper, with special focus on the RBF SVM as a case study and important example of where the most popular approach to evasion attack generation can predictably fail, and be improved upon.
GRADIENT-DESCENT METHOD FAILURE MODES
In this section, we explore how the gradient-descent method can fail against RBF SVMs with small kernel widths.
Illustrative Example. To demonstrate our key observation, we trained two RBF SVMs on a toy two-class dataset comprising two features [11, 12] , using two distinct values for γ : 10 2 and 10 4 . Figure 2 displays the heatmaps of the two models' decision functions. As can be seen, for the larger γ case, additional regions result with flat, approximately-zero, decision values. Since the gradients in these regions are vanishingly small, it is significantly more likely that an iterate in the gradient-descent method's attack trajectory will become trapped, or even move towards a direction away from the decision boundary altogether. Notably, both models achieve test accuracies of 100%.
In Figure 2 (a), the two black curves marked with crosses demonstrate how two initial target points (−0.55, −0.1) and (−0.75, −0.5), move towards the decision boundary following the gradient-descent method. However, the two magenta curves marked with squares in Figure 2 (b) demonstrate how the same two points either move away from the boundary or take significantly more steps to reach it, following the same algorithm but under a different model with a much larger γ .
This example illustrates that although the gradient-descent method makes the test sample less similar to the original class, it does not necessarily become similar to the other class.
Discussion. We employ Figure 3 to further explain possible failure modes of the gradient-descent method: points may get stuck or even move in the wrong direction. In this given 2D case, x 1 belongs to Class 1, and x 2 to Class 2. At instance x, the k th component of the gradient is
). Clearly, the sign of ∇ k can be flipped by various choices of γ . Suppose x 1 1 , x 1 2 > x 1 , then solving for ∇ 1 = 0, we obtain the point at which this phase transition occurs as:
The failure modes hold true in multiclass scenarios. For test sample x the classifier evaluates an f i (x) per class i and selects the maximiser (a one-vs-all reduction). Suppose that f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) are the highest class scores. If γ is chosen appropriately as above, , , then gradient descent reduces both f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) without ever reranking the two classes. Figure 3 presents a geometric explanation, where distance between support vectors of opposite classes exceeding kernel width results in gradient-descent method iterates becoming trapped in the "gap" between. This section partially addresses Problem 3.1 through the discussed limitations, while setting γ can provide a level of defence per Problem 3.2.
THE GRADIENT-QUOTIENT METHOD
The previous section motivates Problem 3.3's search for effective alternatives to decreasing current class i f i (x) while increasing desired class j f j (x). Rather than moving in the direction −∇f i (x) as the gradient-descent method does (noting this is in the subgradient for the one-vs-all reduction), we propose following the gradient of the quotient −f i (x)/f j (x):
does not achieve the desired result by the same flaws suffered by the gradient-descent method: f i (x), f j (x) and f i (x) − f j (x) are decreased simultaneously, while f i (x) can remain larger than f j (x), with no misclassification occurring.
Note that while in the above, i is taken as the current (maximising) class index, taking j as the next highest-scoring class corresponds to evasion attacks while taking j as any fixed target class corresponds to a mimicry attack. The results of Section 7 establish that this method can be more effective for manipulating test data in multiclass settings. However, it is not appropriate to binary-class cases as −f 1 (x)/f 2 (x) = 1.
Step Size. The step size ε t is important to select carefully: too small and convergence slows; too large and the attack incurs excessive L 1 change, potentially exposing the attack.
In our experiments, we limit the largest change made to a single feature per iteration, and determine the step size accordingly as described in Algorithm 1. Here η is a domain-specific value corresponding to a unit change in a feature, e.g., for a grayscale image η = 1 corresponds to a unit change intensity level. The select rule's [5η, 10η] is motivated by round-off practicalities in steps: if the largest gradient component were smaller than 5η, it is likely that Algorithm 1: Gradient-quotient step size. 
EXPERIMENTS: GRADIENT-DESCENT METHOD
Section 4 demonstrates that RBF SVM is less vulnerable to evasion attacks when γ is set appropriately. In this section, we present a more detailed analysis of the impact of γ on the attack's success rate, further addressing Problems 3.1 and 3.2.
Datasets
Three datasets are selected to facilitate the analysis on γ : (1) MNIST [18, 19] is a dataset of handwritten digits that has been widely studied. 
Impact of γ on Vulnerability (Binary Class)
We begin with the binary scenario and investigate how γ impacts the success rate of causing SVMs to misclassify (1) three pairs of The reason why we choose 30 is that although larger values will increase the attack's success rate, the changes made to the original samples are so obvious they would be easily detected by manual audit. Tables 2a-2c , 3a-3c and 4 illustrate a phase transition in all cases: a small decrease of γ causes a significant jump in success rate. Figure 6 visualises the phase transition. 2 From the attacker's point of view, in addition to minimising the overall changes, it is also desirable that no single pixel is modified by a large amount when perturbing an image, i.e., ∥δ ∥ ∞ < B ∞ ∈ R + (B ∞ can be considered as the attacker's budget). Therefore, we modify the original optimisation problem 1 as follows:
We apply much stricter stopping criteria, and re-run the experiments on MNIST and USPS. As can be seen from Tables 5 & 6 , a phase transition still exists in each case.
Inter-Class-SV Distance. Since γ controls how quickly the RBF kernel vanishes, we are motivated to compare minimum (Euclidean) distance between each support vector of one class (sv 1i ) and all support vectors of the opposite class (sv 2j ), i.e., MinDist(sv 1i ) = arg min j Distance(sv 1i , sv 2j ). Our intuition is that a larger γ suggests (1) a quicker drop of values for both the kernel function and the gradient; (2) a wider gap between the two classes. Both observations contribute to the lower success rate of the evasion attack.
Figures 4 and 5 present the minimum distance between support vectors of classes "3" and "4" in the MNIST dataset (due to similarities, we omit the other results). Observe that when γ first decreases from 0.5, the support vectors of the opposite class move further away-here the corresponding model is still less vulnerable to evasion attack. As γ continues to decrease the trend reverses, i.e., the support vectors of opposite class move closer to each other. A smaller γ already means the RBF kernel vanishes more slowly, and the closer distance between the two classes makes it even easier for a test sample to cross the decision boundary. Consequently, the corresponding model becomes much more vulnerable.
This prompts the question: Given a model with a γ , is there a way to determine whether the model is robust? The results in Tables 2a-2c , 3a-3c and 4 witness a strong correlation between success rate and the percentage of "2/ √ γ ≥ minimum distance"-the lower the percentage the less vulnerable the model.
Margin Explanation.
We have also observed a positive correlation between margin per support vector and the minimum distance calculated above. These findings suggest that separated inter-class support vectors lead to more secure models, lending experimental support to the geometric argument (Section 4).
Linear SVM. The experiments are performed for linear SVMs on MNIST, with results serving as baseline. Table 2d demonstrates that success rates under linear models are 100%, as expected. However, a larger C requires smaller changes to the target sample, as larger C leads to smaller margin.
Discussion on model robustness vs. overfitting. It should be noted that we are not suggesting larger γ induces robustness. Instead, we demonstrate a phrase transition with small increase to γ causes significant success rate drop for evasion attacks. Further increase to γ over the threshold value offers little benefit. Our current results suggest that the model may (Table 4) or may not (Tables 2, 3) overfit when γ reaches the threshold value.
Impact of γ on Vulnerability (Multiclass)
This section further investigates the impact of γ on success rate of evasion attacks, in multiclass scenarios. For the MNIST dataset, two RBF SVMs with γ as 0.05 and 0.5, are trained on both D 1 and D 2 , respectively. For comparison, four linear SVMs are also trained on , , Adequacy of the Gradient-Descent Method for Classifier Evasion Attacks , , Tables 7 and 8 : (1) for RBF SVMs, the success rates under the models with larger γ are much lower; (2) for linear SVMs the success rates are always 100%, but the average L 1 change is smaller as C increases-observations consistent with previous results.
EXPERIMENTS: GRADIENT-QUOTIENT METHOD
In this section we present experimental results establishing the effectiveness of our proposed method for generating adversarial samples.
Attacking SVMs & RBF Networks Directly
Recall that based on our new approach, a test sample x is updated as
, where f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) are the scores for the top two scoring classes for x. In order to test whether this method is more effective than the popular gradient-descent method, we run similar experiments to Section 6.3, (1) for the MNIST dataset, one RBF SVM (γ = 0.5, C = 10) and one linear SVM (C = 1000) are trained on D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D 5 , respectively; (2) for the USPS dataset, the RBF SVM with γ = 0.5, C = 10 2 is reused.
Comparing the results in Table 7 and Table 9 , we observe that the gradient quotient method is very effective against SVMs trained on the MNIST dataset: (1) for the RBF SVMs with γ = 0.5, the success rates increase from around 24% to a resounding 100%. Moreover we have tested a wide range of values for γ from 0.01 through , , 10, with resulting success rates always 100% under our new approach; (2) the required L 1 perturbation also decreases. However, the new method achieves a success rate of only 71.2% (still higher than the gradient descent method's 38.2%) against the RBF SVM trained on the USPS dataset. An examination of the log files reveals that in this case, the second highest score f 2 is always negative, and hence decreasing the quotient of f 1 /f 2 may not work. Interestingly, such finding coincides with our previous conclusion that models with wider inter-class gap are more robust.
Attacking RBF networks. Does the gradient quotient method work with other types of model? We further test it against a RBF network trained on D 1 , with 600 RBF neurons and a learning rate of 0.05. The results show that the success rate is 74.1% (f 2 is also negative in this case), which is slightly lower than the gradient descent method's 79.9%. In summary, the proposed gradient quotient method works most effectively when the scores for both the original and target classes are positive. In other situations, it performs at least similarly to the gradient descent method-none of our experimental results on all datasets and two types of models has shown any obvious inferiority.
Attacking via Surrogate
Up until now, we have implicitly assumed that the attacker possesses complete knowledge of the target classifier, which may be unrealistic in practice. Hence, we next examine attacks carried out via a surrogate. For example, in order to mislead a RBF SVM, the attacker first trains their own RBF SVM on a similar dataset, builds the attack path of how a test sample should be modified, then applies it to the target SVM.
Since there is no guarantee that the surrogate and target classifiers misclassify the test sample simultaneously, all test samples are modified 15 times by the surrogate in this experiment; an attack is Adequacy of the Gradient-Descent Method for Classifier Evasion Attacks , , considered to be successful if the target classifier misclassifies the adversarial sample within 15 steps too. In addition, we modify the method as:
In other words, before the test sample is misclassified by the surrogate, it travels "downhill", but after crossing the decision boundary it travels "uphill". Otherwise the test case continues oscillating back and forth around the boundary.
Intra-model transferability. We reuse the RBF SVMs trained on D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D 5 , each of which serving as both surrogate (S i ) and target (T i ) classifiers. As can be seen from Table 10 , the success rates are all over 65%. Specifically, those values inside the bracket are the success rates when the target classifier misclassifies before the surrogate, while the values outside are the overall success rates. For comparison, the same experiments have been performed for linear SVMs, producing similar success rates (54%-71%), notably higher than previous findings (around 40%) reported by Papernot et al. [30] . 
Mimicry Attacks
The previous two subsections have demonstrated that our new approach is effective in manipulating test samples. But what if the attacker intends to make the test sample misclassified as a specific class?
In order to test the gradient quotient method for mimicry attacks, we make the following change: x t +1 = x t − ε t · ∇(f 1 (x)/f T (x)), where f T (x) corresponds to the score of the target class, while f 1 (x) is still the score for the top scoring class.
For each test sample in the MNIST dataset, we apply the gradient quotient algorithm to check whether it can be misclassified as each of the other nine digits. The RBF SVM (γ = 0.5, C = 10) and the linear SVM (C = 1000) trained on D 1 are reused here. The results in Figure 7 show that in most cases this approach can successfully make the original digit misclassified as the target. However, under the RBF SVM, the success rate is very low when the attack is to make other digits look like "0". The reason is still that f 0 (x), i.e., the score for digit "0", is always negative.
Another interesting point is that among the successful cases where other digits are misclassified as "0", over half of them are digit "6". Therefore, we tried an indirect method-first modify the test sample so that it is considered as "6" (the success rate for this step is 100%), and then follow the original method, i.e., modify "6" until either it is classified as "0", or the maximum step limit of 30 is reached. This indirect approach doubled the overall success rate.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Recent studies have shown that it is relatively easy to fool machine learning models via adversarial samples. In this paper, we demonstrate that the gradient-descent method-the leading approach to generate adversarial samples-has limitations against RBF SVMs, when the precision parameter γ controlling kernel smoothness is chosen properly. We find predictable phase transitions of attack success occur at thresholds that are functions of geometric marginlike quantities measuring inter-class support vector distances. Our characterisation can be used to make RBF SVM more robust against common evasion and mimicry attacks.
We propose a new method for manipulating target samples into adversarial instances, with experimental results showing that this new method not only increases attack success rate, but decreases the required changes made to input points.
For future work, (1) regarding the gradient-descent method, we intend to replicate and expand findings for γ and smoothness in general, in other settings and for other classifiers. (2) We will continue exploring suitability of our new generation approach when the target is not an SVM, with direct attacks or SVM surrogates. (3) Further investigation into light-weight yet efficient countermeasures also serves as an important direction for future work.
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